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FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN:
NAVIGATING THE NARROWS BETWEEN
GRUTTER AND PARENTS INVOLVED
Kimberly A. Pacelli*
I. INTRODUCTION
Universities’ use of race as a factor in their admissions decisions has been a
divisive issue both in the legal system and in political discourse. Opponents of
affirmative action have challenged racial preferences in public university
admissions under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Individuals who find themselves denied a coveted seat in a university class and
suspect that racial preferences are to blame will often challenge their rejection as a
denial of their state’s “equal protection of the laws.”1 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently considered whether the University of Texas at
Austin’s use of race as a factor in its admissions system denied two white
applicants, who were refused admission to the university, equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Fisher is only the latest chapter in a long and
complex history of jurisprudence regarding the use of race in college admissions.
Although this full and rich history has received generous and thorough
treatment from hundreds of scholars, this Note will consider only the two most
recent cases regarding race-conscious admissions: Grutter v. Bollinger3 and
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (Parents
Involved).4 Whereas Grutter permitted race-consciousness within certain generous
parameters, many scholars have expressed concern that Parents Involved, which
restricted racial preferences by public secondary charter schools, may signal that
the current Supreme Court has grown increasingly reluctant to continue its typical
deference to affirmative action efforts in higher education. Social scientist Patricia
Gurin, who provided expert testimony in the Grutter case, highlights the tension
between educators and the legal system:
Educators in American higher education have long argued that affirmative action
policies are essential to ensure a diverse student body, that such diversity is crucial
to creating the best possible educational environment, and that the educational
benefits of racial and ethnic diversity on campus are not limited to any one group
5
of students.

William G. Bowen and Derek Bok, in their extensive longitudinal study of
* J.D. Candidate, 2011 University of Maine School of Law. The Author thanks Professor Jennifer
Wriggins for her valuable insight and commentary, as well as Professor Melvyn Zarr and Librarian
Maureen Quinlan for their thoughtful guidance.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
2. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
3. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
4. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
5. PATRICIA GURIN, ET AL., DEFENDING DIVERSITY 100 (2004).
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race in college admissions, describe specifically how this educational goal plays
out in the admissions process. They identify four main goals that admissions
officers have in deciding among applicants, including a desire to “assemble a class
of students with a wide diversity of backgrounds” in order to provide students with
a richer classroom experience than that provided by the curriculum alone.6
Educators argue, therefore, that using affirmative action in college admissions
allows them to admit as diverse a class as possible in order to improve educational
outcomes for all students.
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin provides the first opportunity since
Parents Involved to explore what that case might mean for university admissions.
Fisher presents a novel question regarding affirmative action-based Equal
Protection challenges because the University’s acknowledged use of race for some
applicants in its admissions system operates alongside the legislatively-mandated
race-neutral Top Ten Percentage Plan, which guarantees admission to all graduates
of Texas public high schools finishing near the top of their class, effectively
boosting enrollment of students of color without explicit use of racial preferences.
Fisher presents for the first time the question of whether the success of a raceneutral alternative for admitting some students of color demands that a university
abandon the use of race as a factor in the admission of other students. It also
provides a first opportunity to test the hypothesis that Parents Involved signaled the
Court’s unwillingness to continue its deference to higher education administrators
in their pursuit to achieve campus diversity through racial preferences.
This Note will focus on the second prong of typical strict judicial scrutiny of
racial classifications.7 The Supreme Court has held that, “racial classifications . . .
must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to
further that interest.”8 This Note will focus on the second prong of this test:
whether the University of Texas at Austin’s use of race is narrowly tailored enough
to pass constitutional muster.9 In Part II, this Note will discuss the evolving
jurisprudence before Fisher, focusing primarily on Grutter and Parents Involved.
In Part III, this Note will contemplate the implications of Parents Involved for the
future of race-conscious college admissions. In Part IV, this Note will examine
specifically the Fisher decision and appeal. Finally, in Part V, this Note will
analyze the underlying opinions issued by the District Court and the Fifth Circuit.10
6. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER 23-24 (1998).
7. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Supreme Court held that the standard of review
when racial classifications are challenged under the equal protection clause is the highest level of
review, commonly coined “strict scrutiny.” 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (O’Connor, J.).
8. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)). The Court subsequently rearticulated the rule in the
admissions context: the university must prove that its “use of race in its current admissions program
employs ‘narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.’” Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227).
9. The first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis, whether the goal of racial diversity within the
University is a “compelling government interest” is treated extensively in both Fisher as well as in other
cases, but lies outside the scope of this Note. See Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 601-09.
10. The Fifth Circuit’s decision was rendered immediately before this Note was published.
Therefore, although this Note endeavors to integrate some analysis of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, more
extensive analysis is needed to fully gauge its impact on Grutter.
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Finally, this Note concludes that both courts have protected racial preferences in
college admissions by predominantly resting their analyses on Grutter rather than
Parents Involved.
II. THE ROAD TO FISHER
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin is only the most recent legal challenge
of the use of race in the context of admissions to educational institutions.11 In fact,
the Supreme Court’s first consideration of racial preferences to aid persons of
color, rather than disadvantage them, occurred in the context of preferential
admissions treatment.12 Placing Fisher in historical context requires a review of
four significant cases: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,13 Hopwood
v. Texas,14 Grutter v. Bollinger, and Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1. All four cases contemplate the use of racial
classifications in school admissions decisions and create the legal ambiguity
surrounding narrow tailoring that the plaintiffs seek to leverage in Fisher.
A. Bakke and Hopwood: Texas Becomes Ground Zero
The United States Supreme Court first evaluated whether the use of race by
colleges violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when
it decided Regents of the University of California v. Bakke in 1978. In Bakke, the
Court considered whether a public medical school violated the Equal Protection
Clause when it set aside a certain number of seats for students from specified
minority groups.15 The Court first determined that because racial and ethnic
distinctions are inherently suspect, the Court must apply “the most exacting judicial
examination.”16 Applying strict scrutiny,17 the Court held that a university’s stated
goal of achieving a diverse student body could be a compelling government
interest,18 but that the use of racial quotas was not narrowly tailored to satisfy strict

11. The jurisprudence regarding race in higher education is extensive and complicated and has
received extensive descriptive and analytical treatment by hundreds of authors. See, e.g., Charles J.
Russo & William E. Thro, Higher Education Implications of Parents Involved in Community Schools,
35 J.C. & U.L. 239 (2009).
12. Hannah L. Weiner, The Subordinated Meaning of “Color-Blind”: How John Marshall Harlan’s
Words Have Been Erroneously Commandeered, 11 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 45, 67 (2009).
13. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
14. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). Hopwood is a Court of Appeals opinion, but its significance both
to the national landscape of college admissions as well as to the University of Austin merits its inclusion
alongside Supreme Court cases.
15. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-70 (Powell, J.).
16. Id. at 291.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 311-12. The Bakke opinion was authored by Justice Powell; however, there was extensive
disagreement on the Court at the time about the interaction between the Equal Protection Clause and the
Civil Rights Act. Therefore, the structure of the Bakke opinion raises a question of whether it is binding
precedent on the issue of whether student diversity could be a compelling government interest. In fact,
the Fifth Circuit took this view in Hopwood. See generally Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Piercing the
Veil: William J. Brennan’s Account of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 19 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 341 (2001).
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scrutiny.19 Furthermore, Bakke provided guidance as to how universities may
properly consider race in admissions decisions, noting that the use of race as a
“plus” factor in evaluating a student’s application could be appropriate.20 The
Court envisioned admissions programs that treated “each applicant as an individual
in the admissions process” and that looks to all of the qualities of all individuals
and weighs them, rather than looking at race in any mechanized way.21
Nearly two decades later, the University of Texas at Austin’s admissions
system became the subject of the next major case regarding use of race in college
admissions. In 1996, the Fifth Circuit held in Hopwood v. Texas that the
University of Texas at Austin’s use of race as a “plus” factor gave minority
applicants a “significant” racial preference and thus violated the Equal Protection
Clause.22 The Fifth Circuit found that Bakke was not binding precedent,23
reasoning that the diversity goals of the university were not a compelling enough
government interest to survive strict scrutiny.24 In response, only one year after
Hopwood, the Texas legislature reasserted its commitment to improving racial
diversity at its flagship university by enacting the “Top Ten Percent Plan,” which
guarantees automatic admission for graduating high school seniors in the top ten
percent of every public high school in Texas.25 The Top Ten Percent Plan is still in
place in Texas and is a crucial element in the Fisher case.26
B. The Supreme Court Reaffirms Affirmative Action in Grutter
Although Hopwood was a Fifth Circuit decision, its holding surely confused
the national landscape for the use of race as a factor in college admissions until the
Supreme Court again considered the use of race in college admissions in 2003.27 In
response, the Court’s landmark decision in Grutter v. Bollinger reestablished that
public universities may consider race as a factor in admissions decisions.28
19. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (Powell, J.).
20. Id. at 317.
21. Id. at 318.
22. 78 F.3d at 934-35.
23. Id. at 941-46.
24. Id. at 948 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
25. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2009). For a general discussion of the legislative
history and motivation for passing the Top Ten Percent Plan, see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of
Facially Race-Neutral State Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 293-96
(2001).
26. Also, it is important to note that some scholars have questioned whether percentage plans, such
as the one adopted in Texas, would even pass constitutional muster as being race-neutral because they
are often adopted with racial goals in mind. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Race-Conscious Affirmative
Action and Race-Neutral Policies in the Aftermath of the Michigan Cases, in CHARTING THE FUTURE OF
COLLEGE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: LEGAL VICTORIES, CONTINUING ATTACKS, AND NEW RESEARCH 3556 (Gary Orfield, et al. eds., 2007), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/collegeaccess/affirmative-action/charting-the-future-of-college-affirmative-action-legal-victories-continuingattacks-and-new-research/orfield-charting-the-future-affirmative-action.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2011);
Fitzpatrick, supra note 25.
27. For a full treatment of the case law path from Bakke to Grutter, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Bakke
Revisited, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2003).
28. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Grutter is discussed frequently alongside its companion case, Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), which was announced on the same day. In Gratz, the Court held that
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Overturning Hopwood, the Supreme Court held that the University of Michigan
Law School’s use of race did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and survived
strict scrutiny.29 First, the Court held that the law school had a compelling
government interest in ensuring racial diversity within its student body.30 Second,
the Court held that the law school’s use of race was narrowly tailored to satisfy
strict scrutiny.31
The law school’s admissions system included many factors that helped to
satisfy the narrow tailoring prong. First, the Court was satisfied that the law school
was not using race as a quota,32 but rather as a tool for achieving a “critical mass”
of students of color, a permissible goal.33 Next, the Court put great value on the
law school’s articulated process for making admissions decisions, which included a
“highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational
environment.”34 In other words, race was only one factor, and it was not
dispositive.
The Court also found that the law school had satisfactorily considered raceneutral alternatives.35 The Court disagreed with the petitioner’s argument that the
law school could only use race as a last resort, holding that “[n]arrow tailoring does
not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”36 Instead, the
Court articulated an expectation of “serious, good faith consideration of workable
race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity that the university seeks.”37
This standard, which arguably granted much deference to the law school in how to
achieve its diversity goals, would become an important point of contention in
future cases, including Fisher. Notably, the Grutter opinion ended with the hope
that within twenty-five years, the use of a race-based factor in admissions systems
would no longer be necessary to further a university’s interest in campus
diversity.38
In order to properly understand the context of Fisher, a brief discussion of
Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter is helpful because it foreshadowed issues that

the University of Michigan’s use of race as a factor in its undergraduate admissions system did not
satisfy strict scrutiny because the use of race was too mechanical and inflexible to satisfy the narrow
tailoring prong of strict scrutiny. 539 U.S. at 251. Under the system, all students who were identified as
a part of a minority group were given a twenty-point bonus out of the 100 points needed to guarantee
admission. Id. at 255, 270.
29. See generally Ann Mallatt Killenbeck, Bakke, With Teeth?: The Implications of Grutter v.
Bollinger in an Outcomes-Based World, 36 J.C. & U.L. 1 (2009) (arguing that Grutter went farther than
Bakke by placing stricter obligations on universities).
30. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329. The Court was highly deferential to the University’s determination of
what constitutes an educational benefit afforded by a racially diverse campus, and based its reasoning
primarily on First Amendment academic freedom rights.
31. Id. at 334-40.
32. Id. at 335.
33. Id. at 335-36.
34. Id. at 337.
35. Id. at 339.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 343.
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later arose in both Parents Involved and Fisher.39 Although Justice Kennedy
endorsed diversity as a compelling government interest in Grutter,40 he insisted that
the Court’s extreme deference to the law school as to the proper means to achieve
diversity abandoned strict scrutiny and did not satisfy the narrow tailoring prong.41
Justice Kennedy argued that “[t]he Court confuses deference to a university’s
definition of its educational objective with deference to the implementation of this
goal.”42 Justice Kennedy also questioned the meaningfulness of the difference
between the quotas struck down in Bakke and the law school’s methods of
achieving a “critical mass,” expressing suspicion about the genuineness of the law
school’s assurances that it was not really just implementing quotas under another
name.43
C. Parents Involved Changes the Landscape Again
Although Grutter is the most recent Supreme Court case to consider racial
preferences in higher education, the Court recently revisited similar questions in the
context of public secondary schools. In Parents Involved, the Court considered
whether it violated the Equal Protection Clause to use race as a factor in
determining student placements in public high schools.44 Parents Involved
represents, in many ways, a contradictory view of the use of race in schooling
decisions than the Court’s stance in Grutter and may signal a change in the Court’s
view on these types of equal protection challenges.
In Parents Involved, the Supreme Court was asked to review the system used
by the Seattle School District (the District) to assign students to the city’s ten
public high schools.45 Under the plan, incoming ninth graders could choose which
school to attend; however, some schools were more popular than others.46 The
District used a variety of factors to place students in schools, including race.47 The
District’s plan specified that the racial composition of each school must fall within
ten percentage points of the District’s overall racial balance.48 Because the use of
racial preferences was not narrowly tailored to achieve the District’s stated goals,
the Court held that the plan was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause.49 The Court reasoned that racial classifications must only be used as a “last

39. Id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 387-88.
41. Id. at 388.
42. Id.
43. Id. 391-93.
44. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
45. Parents Involved was a consolidated opinion that also reviewed the use of race by public
schools in Louisville, Kentucky. For purposes of simplicity and brevity, only the Seattle facts are
discussed in this Note.
46. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711.
47. Id. at 711-12.
48. Id. at 712.
49. Id. at 711. The school district argued that its use of race was necessary to ensure, among other
things, the “educational and broader socialization benefits [that] flow from a racially diverse learning
environment.” Id. at 725.
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resort” to achieve a compelling government interest,50 and that the District did not
satisfactorily consider race-neutral alternatives in “good faith.”51
Writing for four members of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts went beyond the
narrow tailoring prong to question whether the diversity interest articulated by the
District satisfied the “compelling government interest” prong of strict scrutiny.52
Justice Kennedy refused to adopt this view, however, and urged in his concurrence
that the plurality opinion represented an “all-too-unyielding insistence” that race
could never be a factor.53 Justice Kennedy’s agreement with the plurality’s view
on narrow tailoring, however, doomed the District’s system and became the
important portion of the case for purposes of the challenge brought forward in
Fisher.
Parents Involved discusses and distinguishes Grutter in a number of ways.54
On the one hand, the Court determined that Grutter was not controlling because
higher education is a different context than public secondary school.55 The Court
further distinguished the District’s plans from the admissions system in Grutter,
where “the consideration of race was viewed as indispensible in more than tripling
minority representation at the law school.”56 In Parents Involved, on the other
hand, the Court found that the minimal impact of the policy on student assignments
“casts doubt on the necessity of using racial classifications.”57 The Court’s heavy
reliance on Grutter, largely for purposes of drawing distinctions that helped to
invalidate the District’s plan in Parents Involved, raises many questions about
whether the Court was signaling a retreat from the principles of Grutter or whether
the Court truly sees affirmative action as a viable program in higher education even
though it may be inappropriate in a public secondary school context.
Unsurprisingly, Parents Involved created many questions about the ongoing
viability of Grutter.
III. THE ACADEMY RESPONDS: DID PARENTS INVOLVED SIGNAL THE END FOR
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION?
In the wake of Parents Involved, questions immediately emerged as to whether
or not the Supreme Court was poised to begin whittling down the Grutter holding
to reduce the constitutionally permissible uses of racial preferences in college
admissions.58 The highly complex and volatile nature of the jurisprudence in this
50. Id. at 735 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)).
51. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 735 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339).
52. Id. at 727.
53. Id. at 787-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
54. For a full treatment of the factual and analytical distinctions, including several considerations
beyond the scope of this Note, see Wendy Parker, Limiting the Equal Protection Clause Roberts Style,
63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507, 512-20 (2009).
55. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 722, 724-25. “In upholding the admissions plan in Grutter,
though, this Court relied upon considerations unique to institutions of higher education,” such as
expansive academic freedom. Id. at 724-25.
56. Id. at 734-35.
57. Id. at 734.
58. For a general discussion of suggestions that Parents Involved signals a first attempt to weaken
Grutter, see generally Michael P. Pohorylo, Note, The Role of Parents Involved in the College
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area certainly raises questions about whether the Court is likely to re-examine and
reverse its holding in Grutter.59 A large part of the scholarship in this area focuses
on Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Grutter and Parents Involved by suggesting in
anticipation that his vote will continue to be crucial in future cases. In order to
frame some of the issues raised in Fisher, this Part will briefly highlight this
scholarship regarding the future of race in higher education admissions after
Parents Involved, paying particular attention to the narrow tailoring portion of the
strict scrutiny analysis.60
A. The Initial Vulnerability of Grutter
For many of the reasons Justice Kennedy articulates in his dissent in Grutter,
some commentators have argued that the narrow tailoring prong of Grutter was
vulnerable even before Parents Involved. One common Grutter critique argues that
the Court was completely—and inappropriately—deferential to the law school’s
assurances that it had “adequately” considered race-neutral alternatives in devising
its admissions system.61 Justice Kennedy himself described the Court’s scrutiny of
the law school’s assurances that its admissions system did not function as a quota
system as “nothing short of perfunctory.”62 In Justice Kennedy’s view, the law
school did not meet its burden to show how its internal monitoring of its “critical
mass” of minority students as it proceeded through its admissions process was any
different than the quotas prohibited by Bakke.63 Scholars often critique this
deference to the law school’s methodology as conflating the compelling
government interest and narrow tailoring analyses, which prior precedent intended
to be separate inquiries under strict scrutiny.64 More specifically, the dissenters in
Admissions Process, 42 CONN. L. REV. 693 (2009) (referencing several possible ways Parents Involved
revises the narrow tailoring analysis, some of which are argued by the Fisher plaintiffs).
59. It is interesting that there has been significant disagreement within the Court about the analytic
framework regarding race-consciousness in admissions. From Bakke through Parents Involved, there
were marked and stark differences among members of the Court on how to deal with race-conscious
remedies. Across the nineteen cases that have dealt with race-conscious government remedies (both
education cases and otherwise) there have been ninety-two separate opinions. Russo & Thro, supra note
11, at 266.
60. The scope of this Note focuses on the narrow tailoring prong of these cases. There is a rich
depth of scholarship on the merits of diversity as a compelling government interest in education, which
lies outside of the scope of this Note. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Shifting Sands: The Jurisprudence of
Integration Past, Present, and Future, 47 HOW. L.J. 795 (2004). Recall also that Justice Kennedy
essentially refused to join the Roberts plurality in Parents Involved due to his adherence to the idea that
diversity can be a compelling government interest. 551 U.S. at 787-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
61. Douglas M. Raines, Grutter v. Bollinger’s Strict Scrutiny Dichotomy: Diversity is a Compelling
State Interest, but the University of Michigan Law School’s Admissions Plan is Not Narrowly Tailored,
89 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 868 (2006).
62. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388-89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 391-92.
64. Raines, supra note 61, at 870. But see Stoner & Showalter, Judicial Deference to Educational
Judgment: Justice O’Connor’s Opinion in Grutter Reapplies Longstanding Principles, As Shown By
Rulings Involving College Students in the Eighteen Months Before Grutter, 30 J.C. & U.L. 583 (2004)
(arguing that the Grutter deference to university administration judgment on admissions methodology
conforms closely with high levels of judicial deference generally to university decisions in other areas,
such as academic freedom, and student judicial sanctions, for example).
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Grutter argue that the Court’s deference to the law school’s definition of its
diversity goals should not necessarily result in deference to “the implementation of
this goal.”65 Some scholars agreed with Justice Kennedy, arguing for more
rigorous scrutiny on the narrow tailoring prong.66
Although accepting that the use of race meets constitutional scrutiny, a second
common Grutter critique argues that the Court did not provide sufficiently clear
guidance to universities on the appropriate use of race as a factor in their
admissions systems.67 Whereas Grutter clearly and unequivocally held that
diversity could be a compelling governmental interest, its holding with respect to
the narrow tailoring analysis “left substantial uncertainty” regarding how to
evaluate whether a particular admissions method that utilized race would satisfy
constitutional scrutiny.68 Although many schools simply adopted the law school’s
method of individualized, holistic review, the Court provided little other guidance
to schools whose resources and staffing levels necessitated a different admissions
methodology than one that conforms neatly to the Grutter model.69 Faced with this
lack of clarity, some universities are reluctant to continue using race despite the
Court’s strong holding in Grutter, rather preferring to err on the side of caution.70
Questions linger whether admissions systems that do not mirror closely the law
school’s will satisfy the narrow tailoring prong. As we will see in Part IV, this
critique is particularly prescient with respect to the employment of racial
preferences alongside Texas’s Top Ten Percentage Plan at issue in Fisher.
B. Parents Involved Raises New Questions
The foregoing analysis bases its scholarship on Grutter itself, even before the
holding in Parents Involved raised further questions about the ongoing viability of
racial preferences in higher education admissions. Indeed, some scholars note that
both before and after Parents Involved, universities remained cautious about racial
classifications in admissions and may have independently limited the use of race in
admissions policies.71
Following Parents Involved, it appears that these
universities took the wise approach. Given Chief Justice Roberts’s strong language
in Parents Involved—“[the] way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race”72—prudent universities will contemplate
whether the case signals a desire to curtail deference to higher education and
require the exhaustion of race-neutral alternatives.73 One general concern about
65. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
66. Raines, supra note 61, at 871.
67. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1478 (2005). See also George La Noue & Kenneth L. Marcus, “Serious
Consideration” of Race-Neutral Alternatives in Higher Education, 57 CATH. U.L. REV. 991 (2008).
68. Ellison S. Ward, Toward Constitutional Minority Recruitment and Retention Programs: A
Narrowly Tailored Approach, 84 N.Y.U.L. REV. 609, 628 (2009).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 631.
71. Id. at 631-32.
72. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748.
73. But see Mary Kathryn Nagle, Parents Involved and the Myth of the Colorblind Constitution, 26
HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 211 (2010) (reviewing dozens of subsequent cases where federal
courts considered Parents Involved and refused to adopt its “colorblind” approach, relying instead on
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Parents Involved is that it could signal an abandonment of customary deference to
higher education. A second concern asks whether the Court’s judicial scrutiny in
Parents Involved could signal that stricter scrutiny will be applied to universities in
the future. The way the Court distinguishes Grutter in Parents Involved, however,
could indicate that the Court finds that the meaningful distinctions between
universities and secondary schools constitute a sufficient constitutional basis to
retain the current validity of race-conscious admissions in higher education.
1. Is the Era of Deference Over?
Several scholars have questioned whether the era of full deference to higher
education is due to come to an end.74 Russo and Thro posit that the Court’s
scrutiny of the narrow tailoring prong will change after Parents Involved, arguing
the decision “creates a greater hurdle for officials in institutions of higher learning
if they try to justify the use of race in the contexts of scholarship and outreach
without first having seriously considered other approaches, perhaps such as
socioeconomic status, that do not directly implicate race.”75 Perhaps the Court’s
holding in Parents Involved signaled only the first wave of judicial effort to apply a
more exacting judicial scrutiny to racial preferences and that in future cases
regarding higher education, the Court will back away from its historic deference to
colleges and universities.
2. Must Universities Now “Exhaust” All Race-Neutral Alternatives?
Other scholars question whether the holding in Parents Involved requires full
exhaustion of race-neutral alternatives before racial preferences may be used. Such
a requirement would signal a departure from the more flexible standard in Grutter,
which explicitly held that “[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every
conceivable race-neutral alternative.”76 Because the District did not demonstrate
that they satisfactorily considered race-neutral alternatives, the Court in Parents
Involved struck down the racial preferences used by the District under the narrow
tailoring analysis.77 Some scholars have suggested, therefore, that the Court’s
language in Parents Involved signals a desire to scrutinize racial preferences more
closely than the Grutter Court. Michelle Adams notes, for example, that the
Roberts opinion in Parents Involved, which includes the Court’s holding that the
District’s plan did not satisfy narrow tailoring, cites prior language from Justice
Kennedy that race should only be used as a “last resort” in the context of racial
preferences in government contracting.78 Adams argues that the inclusion of this

decades of other Equal Protection jurisprudence and suggesting that Parents Involved might not be as
influential as feared).
74. Russo & Thro, supra note 11, at 268.
75. Id.
76. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
77. Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U.L. REV. 937, 982 (2008).
78. Id. at 981 (citing City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)).
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language signals a rejection of the deferential approach taken in Grutter.79 Parents
Involved begs the question of whether the Court will reverse course from Grutter
and hold that universities will only satisfy the narrow tailoring prong of strict
scrutiny after they exhaust all race-neutral alternatives before turning to racial
preferences.80
Practically speaking, if the Court does require exhaustion of race-neutral
alternatives, some scholars express concerns that universities will continue to use
race as a factor, albeit covertly.81 By using racial proxies rather than race itself,
universities may continue to use race implicitly to achieve classroom and campus
diversity.82 For example, class-based affirmative action plans or percentage plans
like Texas’s Top Ten Percentage Plan (or other supposedly race-neutral programs),
might allow universities to seek racial diversity by cloaking their goals in other
terms.83 As a matter of public policy, do we want to encourage universities to be
transparent about the means employed to reach their diversity interests, or would
we prefer that universities be covert about their diversification efforts?
3. Are Racial Preferences Still Permissible if Their Impacts are Only “Minimal?”
Another area of concern contemplates what the Fisher court describes as the
Parents Involved “minimal effect” argument.84 In Part III-C of the Parents
Involved decision, joined by Justice Kennedy, the Court ruled that the District’s
plan was not narrowly tailored because it only had a “minimal effect on the
assignment of students, . . . suggest[ing] that other means would be effective.”85
The insufficient impact of the use of race suggested to the Parents Involved
majority that the District could have employed other race-neutral means to achieve
the same diversification goals.86 Acknowledging the danger of its own reasoning,
the Court clarified that although it was “not suggest[ing] that greater use of race
would be preferable, . . . the minimal impact . . . casts doubt on the necessity of
using racial classifications.”87 Distinguishing the facts of Parents Involved from
those in Grutter, the Court noted that “[i]n Grutter, the consideration of race was
viewed as indispensible in more than tripling minority representation.”88 After
Parents Involved, one may reasonably ask whether the traditional deference to
higher education will be eviscerated if universities decide to use race as a factor in
very few admissions decisions relative to their entire admissions system. This
“theory of insufficient impact” raises a question of whether the Court intends to
shift to a results-oriented approach in evaluating evidence of whether a university’s
admissions program satisfies the narrow tailoring inquiry.
79. Adams, supra note 77, at 982.
80. Id.
81. Andrew LeGrand, Narrowing the Tailoring: How Parents Involved Limits the Use of Race in
Higher Education Admissions, 21 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 53, 78 (2009).
82. Id. at 78.
83. Id.
84. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 609-10 (2009).
85. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 732.
86. Id. at 733.
87. Id. at 734.
88. Id. at 734-35.
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4. Is Parents Involved Even Relevant to Higher Education?
Despite the concern that Parents Involved could signal the Court’s intent to
overturn or curtail Grutter, some proponents of ongoing affirmative action in
higher education distinguish Parents Involved by limiting its applicability to higher
education. For example, several scholars argue that the language of Parents
Involved may be interpreted as the Court’s recognition that there are sufficient
distinctions between the secondary and post-secondary educational contexts to
keep the Grutter holding intact. The Roberts opinion in Parents Involved takes
care to distinguish the District’s admissions decisions from the facts of the higher
education cases.89 Scholars are left asking whether this characterization represents
an honest distinction between the two educational contexts or if it is simply a tool
to avoid applying the Grutter holding to the facts of Parents Involved.
It is also possible to distinguish Parents Involved based on facts pertinent to
the narrow tailoring analysis. For example, one may reasonably argue that the
Parents Involved holding simply requires a good-faith consideration of race-neutral
alternatives.90 The fact that the District officials did not demonstrate that they had
actually made a good faith effort to consider race-neutral alternatives to achieve
diversity in student school assignments was an important determinant in Parents
Involved.91 Furthermore, the record before the Parents Involved majority focused
on the design and operation of the District’s admissions systems, and included a
complete failure by school board officials to seriously consider any race-neutral
alternatives.92 One can make the argument that a university that does seriously
consider alternatives to racial preferences may be able to survive a narrow tailoring
analysis, even under Parents Involved’s reasoning.
Another possible view of Parents Involved interprets its holding as striking
down a system that operated like a quota system, more akin to the types of
admissions systems the Court has continually struck down in cases such as Bakke
and Gratz. This interpretation seeks to protect a more individualized review such
as the type of admissions methodology upheld in Grutter. In Parents Involved, the
Court compared the District’s plan to a constitutionally impermissible quota
system, noting that “the plans are directed only to racial balance, pure and simple,
an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate.”93 Under this
interpretation of Parents Involved, therefore, universities are able to satisfy the
narrow tailoring prong by showing that their admissions methods provide for an
individualized review of applicants. Arguably, if a university establishes that its
use of race is more akin to the “individualized” and “holistic” review upheld in
Grutter, than the Parents Involved decision does not apply.
Fisher provided the first opportunity to test whether Parents Involved dictated
a shift in judicial scrutiny over continued use of race in university admissions. On
89. See generally Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 722-28 (emphasizing that Grutter involved the
unique context of higher education).
90. La Noue & Marcus, supra note 67, at 1003-04.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 970-75 (9th
Cir. 2004)). For example, the Roberts opinion cites testimony from one school board member that he
“chose not to read” reports detailing less racially-based options put before the Board. Id.
93. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 726.
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the one hand, Parents Involved seems to indicate a stricter and less deferential
analysis of whether the use of race is narrowly tailored, which may make it more
difficult for universities to demonstrate the ongoing viability of the use of racial
classifications as a tool to achieve campus diversity.
Conversely, other
interpretations of Parents Involved that focus on the distinction between the higher
education and secondary education contexts signal the possibility of a
constitutionally permissible use of racial preferences in higher education going
forward. Overall, it may be difficult to predict how Parents Involved changes the
narrow tailoring inquiry because of its structure as a plurality opinion. Of course,
Justice Kennedy played a pivotal role in both the Grutter and Parents Involved
cases. With this backdrop in mind, we can now examine the specifics of Fisher,
the first opportunity for federal courts to grapple with the Fourteenth Amendment
in higher education after Parents Involved.
IV. FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
Fisher appears to be the first reported case considering a challenge to college
admissions under the Equal Protection Clause since Parents Involved. The Fisher
plaintiffs, two white students who were denied admission to the University of
Texas at Austin (UT), argue that the success of Texas’s Top Ten Percent Plan
(TTPP) renders UT’s ongoing use of race as an admissions factor a violation of
their equal protection rights.
A. Procedural History
The Fisher challenge germinated from a complaint filed by the United States
Department of Education, which determined that Parents Involved barred UT from
the explicit use of race due to the TTPP.94 Shortly thereafter, claiming an equal
protection violation in UT’s admissions methodology, the plaintiffs filed their
lawsuit and moved for a preliminary injunction to order UT to admit them both.95
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas rejected their
motion due to their lack of substantial likelihood of success on the merits.96 After
the plaintiffs and UT agreed to bifurcate the trial into separate liability and remedy
phases, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on the question of
“whether UT’s admissions policies and practices violate the Equal Protection
Clause.”97 On August 21, 2009, the District Court ruled for UT; the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the District Court on January 18, 2011.98

94. LeGrand, supra note 81, at 67 (citing Complaint Filed Against University of Texas with the
U.S. Department of Education Over Admissions Policy (July 23, 2008)), available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stores.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/07-232007/0004630597&EDDATE (last visited Feb. 07, 2008) (on file with author).
95. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 556 F. Supp. 2d 603 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
96. Id. at 609.
97. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
98. On appeal, the passage of time altered the procedural posture of the case. Because neither
student sought to reapply to UT, the appellants only had standing to seek money damages for injuries
alleged. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 217 (2011).
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B. Factual History
For many years, UT has used its Personal Achievement Index (PAI) as its
rubric to evaluate prospective students. In an effort to provide a holistic review of
candidates, the PAI supplements traditional markers of academic achievement and
seeks to identify meritorious applicants who may not have the strongest high school
class rank or test scores.99 Following Hopwood’s invalidation of race as a factor in
admissions, UT ceased using race immediately as a factor within the PAI.100
Following Hopwood and its immediate cessation of racial preferences, UT
discovered that minority enrollment decreased immediately.101 To increase
minority enrollment at UT, the Texas legislature enacted the TTPP,102 a program
still used by UT.103 The TTPP did result in enrollment increases for students of
color. In 1997, when Hopwood first went into effect, 2.7 percent of the entering
class was black and 12.6 percent of the entering class was Hispanic.104 Seven years
later, after the TTPP had taken root, the incoming class included 4.5 percent black
students and 16.9 percent Hispanic students, in contrast.105
Despite the improvements as a result of the TTPP, UT still remained
concerned about recruitment of students of color. After Grutter, UT undertook an
extensive review of diversity on campus and determined there was not a “critical
mass” of students of color, both on campus overall as well as “at a classroom
level.”106 Additionally, students of color reported “feeling isolated.”107 As a result,
UT revised its admissions policy to reintroduce an applicant’s race as one of the
“special circumstances” to measure PAI, in accordance with the new permissive
use of race after Grutter.108 This dual methodology of admitting students of color
through both the TTPP and in the PAI is still in place.109
When measuring a student’s qualifications in the PAI, UT endeavors to
undertake an “individualized and holistic” review as directed in Grutter.110 There
are many factors that can affect an applicant’s PAI, such as demonstrated
leadership qualities, extracurricular activities, awards and honors, work experience,
and community service.111 Race is never explicitly assigned an independent
numerical value itself.112 However, UT identifies race on the front of each
99. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 592.
102. Id. at 593 n.3 (noting that the term “‘[r]ace-neutral’ may be a misnomer. As the parties appear
to agree . . . HB 588 [is] intended to increase minority enrollment and thus, in reality [is] ‘raceconscious.’ But facially th[is] polic[y] [is] race-neutral. . . .”).
103. Id. at 593.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 593-94.
109. Id. at 594-95. The University does not have a stated end date for the use of race as a part of the
PAI. The University informally reviews its admissions policies each year and undertakes a formal
review every five years. Id. at 594.
110. Id. at 593.
111. Id. at 597.
112. Id.
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applicant’s admissions file, and the file reviewer is aware of an applicant’s race as
he or she reads the file, even though race is not considered a “plus factor” in
PAI.113 Instead, evaluators may factor in special circumstances, such as family
socio-economic status, school socio-economic status, family responsibilities,
single-parent household, English as a second language, or relative SAT scores
compared to the average at the student’s high school.114 In other words, an
applicant’s achievements are placed in a context that may include racial
awareness.115 The admissions staff does not track aggregate data on the racial
composition of the admitted class as they go through the admissions cycle each
year.116
Though UT undertakes both informal and formal reviews of its admissions
system, it does not have a specified end date designated to stop using race as a
factor in its system.117 UT has achieved considerable national attention for its
success in graduating students of color.118 Because the admissions system has
changed multiple times over the past ten years, it is difficult to attribute the
increases clearly or exclusively to either the TTPP or the use of race in PAI.119 It is
clear, however, that comparing one program against the other, the majority of
students of color at UT are admitted under the TTPP. In 2008, for example, 85
percent of admitted Hispanic students and 80 percent of admitted black students
were admitted under the TTPP.120 The District Court noted that whereas UT’s use
of race in the PAI is akin to the “holistic . . . individualized assessment” mandated
by Grutter, the fact that the admissions system is dominated by the TTPP raises
questions about the constitutionality of this two-tiered admissions system.121
C. The Parties’ Arguments
The plaintiffs argued that UT’s use of race violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it failed both prongs of strict
scrutiny, serving neither a compelling government interest122 nor satisfying the
narrowly tailored standard. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that even if UT
satisfied the compelling government interest prong, its use of race was not
narrowly tailored because: (1) it produced only minimal gains in minority
enrollment; (2) it failed to consider race-neutral alternatives; (3) it was overinclusive because it benefited Hispanic applicants, who were not underrepresented
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 598.
117. Id. at 594.
118. Id. UT ranks sixth nationally “in producing undergraduate degrees for minority groups.”
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 595.
122. The Fisher plaintiffs asserted that UT’s use of race did not serve a compelling government
interest because: (1) it was not tethered to the educational benefits in student body diversity identified in
Grutter; and (2) UT did not define with enough specificity what amount of student of color enrollment
would achieve a “critical mass” to realize the educational benefits of a diverse student body. Pls.’ Mem.
in Support of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 8, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587
(W.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 1:08-cv-00263-SS), 2009 WL 5055458.
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in Texas nor at the University; and (4) it had no defined end point.123 The plaintiffs
first asserted an argument akin to the “theory of insufficient impact” argument from
Parents Involved, arguing that the use of race in PAI was not necessary and failed
narrow tailoring because it resulted in only minimal increases in student of color
enrollment.124 Furthermore, the plaintiffs also drew upon Parents Involved in
making their argument that UT failed to adequately consider race-neutral
alternatives, noting that the use of race must only be a “last resort.”125 The
plaintiffs argued that the overall success of the TTPP indicated that race-neutral
alternatives were not only available, but also sufficient to meet UT’s diversity
interest.126
UT responded that its use of race was entitled to the kind of deference the
Court established in Grutter.127 Because the entire judicial framework allowed for
“flexible, nonmechanical” use of race by universities, UT plainly asserted that
“[t]his case is governed by Grutter, not Gratz or Parents Involved.”128 UT further
argued that its use of race in PAI satisfied both the compelling governmental
interest and the narrow tailoring prongs.129 UT emphasized that it satisfied all of
Grutter’s criteria to gauge narrow tailoring, in that: (1) the PAI did not operate as a
quota system; (2) it provided flexible, individual review; (3) it included good faith
consideration of race-neutral alternatives; and (4) no undue harm befell any racial
groups.130 UT urged that its use of race was less burdensome than the policy
upheld in Grutter because the PAI’s use of race could benefit a student of any
racial group, including whites or Asian-Americans, who were not traditionally
underrepresented.131 UT concluded that its use of race was more modest than the
policy upheld in Grutter.132
On the question of narrow tailoring, UT responded to the plaintiffs’ arguments
in three broad ways: (1) it challenged the utility of the “theory of insufficient
impact”; (2) it argued it adequately considered race-neutral alternatives; and (3) it
sought to limit the applicability of the “last resort” mandate in Parents Involved.133
123. Id. at 8-9.
124. Id. at 9.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Defs.’ Mem. in Support of Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. and in Opp. to Pls.’s Mot. for Partial
Summ. J. at 5, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 1:08-cv00263-SS) [hereinafter Defs.’ Mem.].
128. Id.
129. Id. at 8, 10. In arguing it had a compelling government interest, UT reasserted “the educational
benefits of a diverse student body,” as upheld in Grutter. UT cited its broad educational vision as
including multi-faceted student diversity that encompasses numerous dimensions, including but not
limited to, race. Having found that it did not have a critical mass, UT sought to employ racial
consideration to achieve greater diversity. UT further asserted it had a compelling interest in improving
diversity “at the classroom level” in order to ensure that students’ educational experiences, such as
classroom discussions, truly derived the benefits of a diverse student body. Id. at 8-10.
130. Id. at 10-12.
131. Id. at 12. To make its point, UT hypothesized about a white applicant, selected student body
president at a predominantly black high school and offering a “unique perspective on race relations,”
would be accordingly valued in the PAI. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 20-24.
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First, UT attempted to narrow the applicability of “theory of insufficient impact”
from Parents Involved as applying only to rigid, mechanical racial classifications,
rather than the flexible, individualized systems used in the PAI.134 UT also argued
that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence supported an interpretation that the
applicability of the “theory of insufficient impact” turned on whether race was a
rigid classification.135 Second, UT argued that its reliance on the TTPP as its
dominant method of admitting students of color demonstrated its good faith
consideration of race-neutral alternatives.136 Recalling that Grutter held that
narrow tailoring “does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral
alternative,” UT argued that the plaintiffs’ reliance on Parents Involved “last
resort” language was misplaced.137
Generally speaking, the arguments made by the parties to the District Court,
repeated before the Fifth Circuit, seemed to parallel the general scholarship that
contemplates how much of an impact Parents Involved will have on the Grutter
holding. Whereas the plaintiffs argued that Parents Involved directs stricter
scrutiny and less judicial deference to universities on the narrow tailoring analysis,
UT sought to negate the applicability of Parents Involved to an admissions system
that achieves the type of individualized treatment of each applicant required under
Grutter.
D. The District Court’s Decision
As if signaling its eventual holding, the District Court framed its analysis by
beginning with a review of the facts and analysis of Grutter.138 Finding that UT
satisfied both the compelling governmental interest and narrow tailoring prongs of
strict scrutiny, the District Court upheld UT’s consideration of race in the PAI.139
Notably, the court relied almost exclusively on the Grutter framework for both
parts of the inquiry.140 Furthermore, in its discussion of the narrow tailoring prong,
the court distinguished Parents Involved in several ways that limited its
applicability to the facts of Fisher. For example, the court found that the
undisputed evidence demonstrated that UT did seriously consider race-neutral
alternatives in good faith, notably through the TTPP as well as other recruitment

134. Id. at 20.
135. Id. UT cited the following language: “[T]he number of students whose assignments depends on
express racial classifications is limited. I join . . . the Court’s opinion because I agree that in the context
of these plans, the small number of assignments affected suggests that the schools could have achieved
their stated ends through different means.” Id. (quoting Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 790 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)) (emphasis in brief).
136. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 610.
137. Defs.’ Mem., supra note 127, at 21-22.
138. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 600-01.
139. Id. at 604, 612.
140. In its analysis of the compelling government interest prong, the District Court adhered to the
benefits “stemming from a diverse student body” upheld in Grutter. Id. at 601. The record persuaded
the court that the TTPP and other race-neutral policies were not sufficient to achieve a critical mass of
students of color to satisfy UT’s educational mission. Id. at 603.
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and outreach efforts.141 The court distinguished the Fisher facts from those in
Parents Involved, where the District’s rejection of race-neutral alternatives came
after little or no consideration.142 Simply put, the District Court was more than
satisfied that UT had carefully considered a multi-faceted admissions system that
included several race-neutral alternatives.143 Therefore, the ongoing use of race
was narrowly tailored.144
The District Court also distinguished Parents Involved under the “theory of
insufficient impact” argument put forth by the plaintiffs. The District Court found
that the plaintiffs mischaracterized the Supreme Court’s analysis in Parents
Involved. 145 The District Court interpreted the Supreme Court’s discussion of the
“minimal effect” of the racial classifications not as adding a new element to the
narrow tailoring analysis but rather simply evidence that the District had failed to
consider race-neutral alternatives in good faith.146 The District Court stated “the
question is not whether the means adopted by UT exceeds some undefined
‘minimal effect’ on diversity, but rather whether UT has demonstrated ‘serious,
good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.’”147 In other words,
the District Court construed Parents Involved as immaterial on this point as long as
UT satisfied its burden of good faith consideration.
In conclusion, the District Court upheld UT’s use of race as a part of its
evaluation of applicants as satisfying both prongs of strict scrutiny. In doing so, the
court found Grutter to control almost exclusively and severely curtailed the
applicability of Parents Involved as applied to these facts.
E. The Fifth Circuit
On January 18, 2011, the Fifth Circuit issued its long-awaited opinion in
Fisher.148 Although the opinion affirms the District Court, it reveals that the threejudge panel grappled with the narrow tailoring prong just as scholars had after
Grutter and again after Parents Involved. Whereas all three judges on the panel
saw the case as squarely governed by Grutter, only two seemed to find that UT’s
use of race satisfactorily passed constitutional muster.149
141. Id. at 610. The court also relied on specific evidence of scholarship programs intended to
increase the yield of admitted students of color, expanded outreach efforts, and increased recruitment in
low-performing high schools.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 612.
145. Id. at 610.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (2011). The Fifth Circuit issued its opinion
shortly before this Note went to the production process. Although some very brief treatment of the
decision is offered for purposes of further illuminating the significance of the case, the Fifth Circuit
opinion is a rich ground for further analysis. Much of the opinion discusses the proper standard of strict
scrutiny that the court should apply. Id. at 231-34. During the production process of this Note, the
appellants petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a rehearing en banc. Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 5,
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. At Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-50822).
149. Id. at 217-18 (“We begin with Grutter v. Bollinger because UT’s race-conscious admissions
procedures were modeled after the program it approved.”). See also id. at 247 (Garza, J., specially

588

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

Writing for the majority, Judge Higginbotham was as satisfied as the District
Court that UT’s use of race satisfied the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny;
however, the opinion did not distinguish Parents Involved in the same way the
District Court did.150 Instead, the opinion expended substantial effort analyzing the
TTPP and cataloging the myriad ways it frustrates the University’s efforts to build
a critical mass of students of color to support its goal of classroom diversity.151
The majority noted that, “while the Top Ten Percent Law appears to succeed in its
central purpose of increasing minority enrollment, it comes at a high cost and is at
best a blunt tool for securing the educational benefits that diversity is intended to
achieve.”152 The Fifth Circuit agreed with UT that the TTPP was not “the sort of
workable race-neutral alternative that would be a constitutionally mandated
substitute for race-conscious university admissions policies.”153 The Fifth Circuit
even suggested that the inflexibility engendered by TTPP, a direct product of the
court’s own decision in Hopwood, actually inhibits UT’s ability to achieve the
student body diversity so central to its public mission.154 Although the opinion did
not say so precisely, it arguably falls in line with the “need not exhaust”
interpretation of the narrow tailoring prong.
The majority opinion also discussed the plaintiffs’ “theory of minimal impact”
argument, though it only devoted two brief paragraphs to the issue before reaching
its conclusion that UT’s use of race is constitutional.155 Here the Fifth Circuit
explicitly limited the applicability of Parents Involved, noting that “Parents
Involved does not support the cost-benefit analysis that Appellants seek to invoke .
. . the ‘minimal effect’ [was offered] as evidence that other, more narrowly tailored
means would be effective to serve the school districts’ interests.”156 The Fifth
Circuit expressly rejected the argument that the some quantitative “impact” should
become a new factor of the narrow tailoring prong.157
Judge Garza’s lengthy concurrence foreshadows UT’s next battle should the
Supreme Court take up Fisher. Incorporating many of the critiques of Grutter both
before and after Parents Involved, he suggested that Grutter itself should be
overturned.158 Judge Garza mounted a full-scale attack on Grutter, challenging its
deferential approach to strict scrutiny, the concept of student body diversity as a
compelling government interest, as well as how narrowly tailored the UT’s use of
concurring) (“I concur in the majority opinion, because, despite my belief that Grutter represents a
digression in the course of constitutional law, today’s opinion is a faithful, if unfortunate, application of
that misstep.”).
150. Id. at 232.
151. Id. at 238-42. Much like the District Court, the Fifth Circuit’s majority opinion suggested that
the constitutionality of the TTPP itself was unclear. Id. at 242. On this point, Judge King wrote a
special concurrence, noting that although he concurred in the judgment and analysis of the majority
opinion, he could not adopt the critique of TTPP, which was not briefed by the parties nor considered by
the District Court. Id. at 247 (King, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 242.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 246.
156. Id.
157. Id. (“The [Supreme] Court did not hold that a Grutter-like system would be impermissible even
after race-neutral alternatives have been exhausted because the gains are small.”).
158. Id. at 247 (Garza, J., concurring).
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race is.159 Most notably, however, he suggested that Grutter is too deferential to
universities that “are no longer required to use the most effective race-neutral
means.”160 By suggesting that any gains in racial composition must be statistically
meaningful in order to be constitutional, Judge Garza implicitly adopted Parents
Involved’s “minimal effect” rationale. Applying this reasoning to Fisher, he wrote,
“[t]he constitutional inquiry for me concerns whether the University’s program
meaningfully furthers its intended goal of increasing racial diversity on the road to
critical mass. I find it does not.”161 Should Fisher reach the Supreme Court, Judge
Garza’s opinion will provide ample opportunity for foes of affirmative action to
continue to leverage Parents Involved to weaken Grutter.
V. ANALYZING THE FISHER DECISIONS AND LOOKING AHEAD
Regardless of the various possible interpretations of Parents Involved, the
Supreme Court certainly raised new questions about the ongoing vitality of racial
preferences in higher education admissions. Will the Supreme Court continue its
deference to higher education on the question of narrow tailoring by allowing
universities to continue experimenting with race-neutral alternatives, as both courts
did in Fisher? Or will the Supreme Court retrench from the deferential approach
and only allow race as a “last resort?” The facts of the Fisher case expose the
contradictory holdings of Grutter and Parents Involved: whereas Grutter holds that
universities “need not exhaust” race-neutral alternatives before turning to racial
classification, Parents Involved expects that racial classifications only be used as a
“last resort.” The holding in Fisher, which aligns more with the more flexible
standard in Grutter, conforms closely to the legal precedents of racial
classifications in higher education admissions and steers a sound course for public
policy reasons.
Fisher provided a first opportunity to explore the legal question of what
satisfies the narrow tailoring prong, and the opinions carefully negotiated the space
between Grutter and Parents Involved by protecting the deferential framework
higher education has historically enjoyed. The courts in Fisher recognized that
higher education is a unique enterprise, and both acknowledged the need to allow
universities to experiment flexibly with various means to increase diversity, and
reinforced the strength of the Grutter legacy.
The Fisher opinions refocus the attention on Grutter in two ways. First,
because of the obvious similarity between two cases that deal with admissions
decisions in higher education rather than public secondary education, both the
District Court and Fifth Circuit looked primarily to Grutter as the governing
precedent to be applied to the facts in Fisher. In the absence of further precedent
from the Supreme Court either abrogating or overturning Grutter, this analysis in
Fisher soundly adheres to principles of stare decisis. The District Court in Fisher
extensively reviewed the facts and legal analysis of Grutter and consistently placed
the facts and arguments by the parties in the context of Grutter to determine
whether UT’s policies conform to Grutter’s constitutional mandate.
159. Id. at 247, 254, 263.
160. Id. at 250.
161. Id. at 260.
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The second method of adhering to Grutter was more nuanced, however, and
effectively addressed concerns that Parents Involved may have signaled a changing
legal landscape. By focusing on the distinctions that Parents Involved made in how
it dealt with Grutter, the District Court in Fisher reinforced the ongoing viability of
Grutter. In other words, the District Court was able to leverage the Supreme
Court’s distinction of Grutter in Parents Involved in order to strengthen the
applicability of the Grutter precedent to the facts in Fisher (although the Fifth
Circuit was less explicit in its treatment of Parents Involved, the effect is the same).
Recall that in Parents Involved, the Supreme Court was careful to articulate that
Grutter did not govern those facts because of the unique and special nature of
higher education. This distinction served UT’s interests in Fisher. Furthermore,
the District Court noted that the facts of Parents Involved represented more of a
mechanized, non-individualized effort to achieve racial balance, which would be
unconstitutional under Grutter.162 Instead, both Fisher opinions ruled that UT’s
use of race was much more individualized and holistic, even alongside the TTPP,
than that at issue in Parents Involved.
Despite Fisher’s focus and adherence to Grutter, an important question
lingers: Does the Grutter holding that universities “need not exhaust” race-neutral
alternatives to survive strict scrutiny still govern? Or did the District Court and
Fifth Circuit err by not adhering to the new Parents Involved mandate that racial
classifications may only be used as a “last resort” when race-neutral alternatives
still exist? Given these apparently contradictory holdings, federal courts must
make a choice. In the context of its adherence to Grutter, with respect to other
dimensions of its strict scrutiny analysis, it follows logically that UT’s policy
should be evaluated in the context of “need not exhaust.” In doing so, UT would
be constitutionally permitted to utilize racial classifications alongside viable raceneutral alternatives. When the courts upheld UT’s system, they not only satisfied
the legal test outlined in Grutter, but also soundly reflected prudent public policy.
The Fisher endorsement of UT’s dual admissions system recognizes that
Parents Involved’s requirement that racial classifications be used only as a “last
resort” in the higher education context is entirely unworkable in practice. The
District Court addressed this squarely in its opinion by recognizing that to adopt the
position taken by the plaintiffs—that the existence of the TTPP rendered continued
use of race unconstitutional—would be to put UT in an “impossible Catch-22.”163
Adopting the plaintiffs’ position would have created an unworkable and unwise
scenario: once a university experiments with race-neutral alternatives, it forfeits all
opportunity to continue to use race as a factor at all. Not only would this trample
upon a university’s First Amendment right to achieve the educational benefits in
accordance with its mission, but it also would seriously jeopardize the Grutter
sunset provision’s broader goal and charge for higher education: to achieve a level
of racial diversity so that race no longer needs to be a factor.
Instead, the Fisher decisions noted that the wiser course is to allow universities
to experiment with admissions strategies, some of which may be race-neutral and

162. Fisher, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 610-11.
163. Id. at 609.
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others of which may consider race as a factor.164 Allowing various types of
institutions to employ a wide range of constitutional means to attract and retain
students from all walks of life will maximize the educational benefits that flow
from diversity on campus. The task of “building a class” is complex work,
reflecting not just the admissions decisions of each student, but also recruitment
policies, retention programs, and financial aid packaging philosophies. Different
universities will need to tailor their approaches to conform to their own unique
diversity goals, their financial resources, and their progress toward achieving
“critical mass.” Courts will be ill-equipped to fashion these policies and will likely
not be nimble enough to evaluate them on an ongoing basis as universities
themselves can do.
Suppose a university, in accordance with Grutter, continues to use race as a
factor in admissions decisions, but also experiments with race-neutral alternatives
in order to increase retention rates, such as a percentage plan for in-state students,
new merit scholarships designed to attract students of color, or expanded oncampus support programs. The university succeeds in yielding more students of
color and student satisfaction survey data and retention statistics show that students
of color are having more success at the university than their counterparts several
years ago. This success builds upon itself in future admissions cycles; marketing
helps to demonstrate that the university is a welcoming place for students of color.
As these successes build upon themselves, although the university continues to use
race as a factor, it comes to depend upon it less.
The Fisher opinions rightly recognize that initial successes in increasing
diversity on campus should not necessarily have to mean an immediate curtailment
of the ongoing use of race as a factor. To hold that it does (perhaps by applying the
Parents Involved “last resort” language and its “minimal effect” analysis) might put
universities in an impossible bind that may never allow them to achieve full racial
neutrality within the Grutter twenty-five year framework. Following the Fisher
treatment of Parents Involved allows Grutter and Parents Involved to stand sideby-side. Once a university strays into a mechanical use of race, it violates narrow
tailoring; but, so long as colleges continue to apply an individualized, holistic
review where race is only one factor, their programs survive strict scrutiny. This
deference and flexibility acknowledges the need for universities to experiment with
various race-neutral alternatives as long as they continue to satisfy a baseline
constitutionality.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court may be called upon to decide whether or not Fisher
sufficiently resolved the apparent ambiguity on the question of whether or not a
university “need not exhaust” all race-neutral alternatives or only use race as a “last
resort.” If the Court resolves this ambiguity, it will provide substantial definition to
the current question of whether or not there is current deference on the value of
164. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 231 (“Rather than second-guess the merits of the University’s decision, a
task we are ill-equipped to perform, we instead scrutinize the University’s decisionmaking process to
ensure that its decision to adopt a race-conscious admissions policy followed from the good faith
consideration Grutter requires.”).
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diversity to educational outcomes and the means they employ to achieve it given to
higher education by Bakke and Grutter, or whether Parents Involved signaled a
new era of judicial scrutiny. If Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin were to
come before the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy will no doubt be the key to the
resolution of this question, due to his previous opinions that the Court has been too
deferential to colleges and universities on the question of narrow tailoring.
Educators who endorse the use of racial preferences as the most effective
means to achieve campus diversity are likely to applaud the Fisher opinions for
steering a course that both neutralizes Parents Involved and protects the ongoing
viability of the Grutter holding. By finding that UT had satisfied its burden
regarding narrow tailoring to consider in good faith race-neutral alternatives, the
lower Fisher court distinguished Parents Involved as requiring only good faith.
Will the Supreme Court be persuaded that Parents Involved can be limited to only
requiring “good faith?” Or does Parents Involved signal the Court’s interest to
more strictly scrutinize this dimension of its narrow tailoring analysis? Fisher’s
focus on good faith was consistent with a deferential approach to higher education
and acknowledged that universities are better equipped—and are a more
appropriate forum than courts—to devise a fabric of admissions policies that
includes experimentation with race-neutral alternatives. Focusing the judiciary on
good faith also allows courts to stay true to fact-based inquiries when constitutional
challenges arise, rather than encouraging courts to second-guess the educational
missions and admissions methodologies employed by particular campuses.

